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This d i s s e r t a t i o n  examines, evaluates, and analyses 
the rationales f o r , and the perfo r m a n c e  as w e l l  as results 
of Communist: China's aid to A f r i c a  between 1956 and 1980. 
Several p r e d i c t i o n s  on the future course of Co m m u n i s t  
China's aid activities are ventured.
This s t u d y  is, inter a a  , based on p u b l i s h e d  
Co m m u n i s t  C h i nese sources.
The m a i n  purposes of Peking's aid activities in A f r i c a  
are as follows; g a i ning dip l o m a t i c  recognition,, securing 
m e m b e r s h i p  in the U n i t e d  Nations, forcing the Republic 
of China out of Africa, e x t e n d i n g  Peking's Influence into 
Africa, and striving to move into a leadership p o s i t i o n  
in Africa.
Af t e r  twe n t y  five years of involvement,* Peking has 
achieved its o b j ectives of gaining diplomatic recognition 
and of s e c uring (J,N . membership. It has succeeded in 
forcing the Republic of China out of most of the A f r ican 
states. However, its success in e x t ending its influence 
into A f r i c a  has not been impressive. N e i t h e r  has It 
succeeded in its quest for leadership, because of the 
constraints of its own internal problems, African n a t i o ­
nalism, W e s t e r n  challenges, and Soviet competition.
A B S TRACT
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C o m munist C h i n a’s aid p o l i c y  towards A f r i c a  is 
u n d e r g o i n g  c e r t a i n  c h a n g e I t  v/ill continue to make 
aid promises, but these w i l l  dv ,„ne in magnitude. 
The s e  are likely to be substituded oy t r a d e , sports, 
c u l tural and educational exchanges, etc. However, as
S o u t h  A f r i c a  is the last target of its r e v o l u t i o n a r y  
a ctivities in Africa, P e k i n g’s m i l i t a r y  assistance to 
South A f r i c a n  "liberation movements" will form a ma j o r  
p a r t  of its future aid commitments. T h o u g h  Peking's 
influence m a y  increase, it is u n l i k e l y  to move into a 
leadership p o s i t i o n  in Africa,
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%PREFACE
Three reasons stimulate m y  interest to do this study. 
The first reason is the growing imc.ojrt&nee of Com m u n i s t  
C h i n a  in the w o r l d  arena. Prior to the late 1950s, 
C o m munist Ch i n a  was regarded by the Western w o r l d  as an 
intimate ally of the Soviet Union. Its role in the 
international arena was v i e w e d  by the West as a s u b ­
ordinate to the Soviet Union and seen as an integral 
part of the Com m u n i s t  bloc. Th e r e f o r e  it faced the 
c ontainment imposed by the United States w h i c h  led the 
West against the Soviet Union in Cold War. However, 
since the 1970s Co m m u n i s t  C h i n a’s importance in i n t e r ­
national politics has risen dramat i c a l l y  because of 
three intertwined causes; the eruption of the Sino~
Soviet dispute? the inclusion of Communist C h i n a  in
the Uni t e d  Nations; and Western illusions about C o m munist
China*
In 1969 Chinese armed forces conf r o n t e d  Soviet 
military forces on the Sino-Soviet border* This incident 
revealed the long existing hostility between Communist 
China and The Soviet Union to the Western world. The 
Illusion of C o m munist solidarity was shattered and 
w e s t e r n  decision makers, e s p ecially those of the United 
States, were quick to capitalize on the kno w l e d g e  that 
they could use the. rift between Communist China and the 
Soviet Union and ally with C o m munist China to check the
’ '«F u . fc
power of the Sov i e t  Union and to contain the Soviet 
threat. T h e refore the United States Immediately e m ­
b ar k e d  on a policy of r a p p r o c h e m e n t  w i t h  Communist China, 
America's new gesture towards C o m m u n i s t  China did give 
C h i n a  an oppo r t u n i t y  to make use of the Intense i n t e r ­
national situation r e s ulting from the US~Soviet c o n f r o n ­
tation and to emerge as a third p o w e r  between the Uni t e d  
States and the Soviet Union, F i n a l l y  the A m e r i c a n  n e w  
policy not only brought C o m munist China into the U * N , , 
but also c o n ferred upon C o m munist China the seat of 
p e r m a n e n t  m e m b e r s h i p  in the Security Council in 1971.
W i t h  the veto po w e r  in the United Nations?, Co m m u n i s t  
China's attitudes towards international issues be g a n  to 
have a decisive effect on the operations of this i n t e r ­
national organization. Under these circumstances anyone 
who is c o n c e r n e d  about international affairs cannot ignore 
C o m m u n i s t  China's activities in the worlt?.
The second reason w h i c h  arouses m y  interest to do 
this study is the fact that C o m munist China is not a 
developed and rich country, wh i l e  it extends aid to 
other countries, Since the aid to Egypt in 1956,
Co m m u n i s t  China has e x t e n d e d  promises and aid to numerous 
Afri c a n  states. Rut ’ nllke ot h e r  aid-giving powers such 
as the Uni t e d  States and the Soviet Union, Co m m u n i s t  China 
itself is a poor, aid r e c e i v i n g , country. Its average 
li v i n g -standard is b e l o w  that of some of its a i d-recipient 
countries in Africa, for example Congo, Zambia and others.
Qjtff
E v e n  in 1956 C o m munist China still r e c eived aid from
Soviet Union, Its economic activities were largely
depen-ient on Soviet assistance, C h o u  En-lai, the
Premier of Co m m u n i s t  C h i n a  then, frankly confessed that
"It is difficult to imagine that we can coop o u r selves
2
up and do w i t hout aid*' . In order to get Soviet aid,
Co m m u n i s t  China had to bear severe repayment terms. All
aid from the Soviet Union was d e l ivered to m a i n l a n d  Ch i n a
as a debt, not free, of charge. Communist China had to
3
r e p a y  the debt: by ;
(a) gold or I n ternational c u r rency like IKS, D o l l a r  
or pound,
(b) a g ricultural products? and
(c) important metals.
The Soviet goods e x t e n d e d  to C o m m u n i s t  Ch i n a  w e r e  pric e d
higher by the Soviets fchan those goods in i n ternational 
4
m a r k e t  *
Columnist China's economic situation has not m u c h
Improved even up to the late 1970s, According to the
W o r l d  Bank, the standard of living in Communist China
falls into the lower on e - t h i r d  or middle of the w o r l d
5
nations , One of Co m m u n i s t  China's official newpapers 
ope n l y  admitted in its editorial that a serious economic 
and financial crisis existed in m a i n l a n d  China. The 
Ch a i r m a n  of its National P l a nning Council, Y a o  Yee-lin,
1980 budget . Considering the past and present economic 
standing of Communist Chinn, its overtures of economic 
aid towards Africa, which is far away from China, become 
increasingly in tere sting.
The third reason is the growing importance of the 
African states in world politics and their involvement 
with Communist China.
After World War I I , the former African colonial 
empires of Britain, France, Belgium and Portugal 
collapsed as new i n dependent African states emerged.
The newly-formed A f r i c a n  states were gran t e d  U.N. m e m ­
bership and form a new group in the U.N. They can exert 
an influential effe c t  on the decisions of the U.N. through 
the "one nation one. vote" principle wh i c h  is the basic 
priclple of that international organization. Cons i d e r i n g
the fact that there wore 45 African members in the U.N.
7 ,
in 197 9 , which was nearly one third of the 152 full
memb e r s h i p  of the U.N,, wo cannot ignore the important
role of African states in international politics. Hence
the impact of C o m munist China's aid policy to A f r i c a  and
the reactions of African countries to Communist China's
6
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%CHAP T E R  ONE 
A i d  as an Instrument of Foreign Policy
PART 1
The Definition of F o r eign Aid
Al t h o u g h  "foreign aid" has b e e n  p r a cticed for more
that three decades since the end of World W a r  XX, it is
difficult to define the term "foreign aid'". The term
appears to have b e e n  first used to describe the Marshall
A i d  Plan, the assistance that the United States extended
to European countries after the S e c o n d  W o r l d  War. Because
the plan (Marshall Aid) was c r e a t e d  for a specific
purpose and for a definite period, its m e a n i n g  and scope
1
were precise and clear » F r o m  its beginning in 1948, the
d e v elopment of the concept of foreign aid has become
quite complex. A m e rican aid, for example, has undergone
several changes since the M a r shall A i d  Policy, mov i n g
from its basic economic nature to m i l i t a r y  aid and then
2 , 
back to economic aid . The changes in the nature and
p urpose of aid have made a d e f i n i t i o n  m u c h  more difficult
than that used to describe Marshall Aid. Professor Hans
Mor g e n t h a u  expl i c i t l y  expresses that "of the seeming and
real innovation w h i c h  the m o d e r n  age has intx'oduced into
the practice of foreign policy, none has pro v e n  more 
' 3
baffl i n g  to both underst a n d i n g  and a.'tion than aid" .
J o h n  White also Indicates the d i f ficulty in defining the
4
m e a n i n g  of foreign aid. as follows :
"As it happens, ’aid' is rather hard to 
define. If we define it s t atistically -—  
say, grants and loans on v e r y  generous 
terms - we have to include all sorts of 
things, such as bribes or supplies of 
m i l i t a r y  equipment, whi c h  m o s t  aid - givers 
pre f e r  not to discuss. If we fasten on 
the aid-givers* motives, saying that only 
those resources whi c h  are p r o v i d e d  w i t h  the 
Intention of pro m o t i n g  devel o p m e n t  should 
be called aid, we are perpet u a t i n g  the old 
illusion and Ignoring the fact that the 
aid'-givers' motives are inevitably mixed. If 
we allow that moti v e s  are mix e d  but demand 
that the term 'aid' s h o u l d  only be used for 
those; transactions wh i c h  do in fact promote 
development, then we a r e■saying that aid 
never f a i l s , because if it failed, it w o u l d
I t
not. be 'aid* .
However, foreign p o l i c y  scholars are still trying 
to describe the essence of foreign aid. Professor Hans 
M o r g e n t h a u  points out in his study that there are six 
types of foreign aid. i.e.:
(1) Humanitarian foreign aid?
- •*--------- — — »,r>, ----
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(2) Subsistence foreign aid;
(3) M i l i t a r y  foreign aid;
(4) Bribery;
(5) Prestige foreign aid; and
5
(6) Fore i g n  aid for economic development .
A l t h o u g h  Hans Mor g e n t h a u  seems to regard the p a y m e n t  to 
a foreign m i n ister or ambassador from a government as 
a i d—  an aspect not generally accepted by other scholars 
like John W h i t e ,—  it is obvious that there are two 
crucial elements n e c essary to describe foreign aid in 
M o r g e n t h a u 1s definition. Firstly, a transfer of money,.
goods and / or services; and secondly; ransfer from6
one nation to another ,
A l t h o u g h  J o h n  White evades a definition of foreign
aid, he proposes methods Cor assessing the results of
a heterogenous c o l lection of transactions, and states
7
that %
"The term ’a i d’ will  be used to cover any 
transfer of resources from rich countries 
to poor countries wh i c h  the former choose 
to call ’a i d’, i.e.*, any transfer the e f f e c ­
tiveness of which is p u b licly assessed, 
though perh a p s  h y p o c r i t i c a l l y  assessed, in 
terms of the benefit to the r e c i p i e n t”.
■ . . I
An obvious flaw exists w i t h i n  this desc r i p t i o n  put 
forward by J o h n  White, i.e. the transaction m u s t  take 
place between a rich and a poor country. This precludes 
any a s s i s t a n c e— a i d — given by one poor country to 
another, or by a poor c o u n t r y  to a rich one. However, 
aid does exist b e t ween two poor countries or by a poor 
country to a richer one. A n  example of this is C o m munist 
C h i n a’s aid to Africa. A c c o r d i n g  to Wor l d  Bank c l a s s i ­
fication, Co m m u n i s t  C h i n a  is a poor country whose GNP 
p e r  capita in 1976 was only 410 w h i c h  was lower than, that
of Ghana (580), M o r o c c o  (540) , Congo (520) and Zambia
8
(420) , but we cannot, deny that the transfer of Chinese 
resources to these A f r i c a n  countries is aid. Despite this 
W h i t e’s description does reveal two important features 
of foreign aid: (1 ) the transfer of resources and (2 ) the 
effectiveness in terms of the benefit to the recipients,
George Kuri a n  holds a similar v i e wpoint to John W h i t e’ 
He defines aid asi
"Foreign aid Is broa d l y  defined as the '
flow of financial resources from developed
market econ-w, d e s  to d e v eloping countries
ex p r e s s l y  intended for the economic and
social d e v elopment of the latter and which
9
is concessional in character" .
▼  ”  * > r "  w  • ■ • « ** « * ,* * «  ,
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According to this definition, aid consists of the 
following features;
(1 ) the flow of financial resources;
(2 ) the flow m u s t  exist between developed and d e v eloping 
countries ?
(3) the purpose r the flow is intended for the economic 
and social d e v elopment of the recipient c o u n t r i e s ? 
and
|4) the flow is concessional in character.
T h e  defect of the first feature is that it restricts the 
aid to that of financial u n d ertakings only. Numerous 
examples show this to be untrue, i.e. a large pro p o r t i o n  
of United States assistance to foreign countries under the 
Mutual S e c urity Act takes the form of m i l i t a r y  aid. The 
second feature of this def i n i t i o n  implies a similar 
q u alification on the status of donor country as John 
White's, Once again Co m m u n i s t  China's aid to A f r i c a  is 
d i s counted because the latter is classified as a d e v e l o p ­
ing country. The third feature of the definition limits 
the purpose of aid to social and economic devel o p m e n t  of the 
recipient countries, A l t h o u g h  this is true in most in­
stances, it does not n e c e s s a r i l y  hold true for all. It 
can be argued that aid to b e l ligerent countries is not 
for social and economic deve l o p m e n t  but for p o l itical 
ends. Once again, the d e finition should not be di s m i s s e d  
out ox h a r d  as the fourth feature - i.e* the flow is
■tiSdl
%
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concessional in character-— does d i s tinguish aid from 
other transactions i n v olving the flow of r e s o u r c e s .
A  further d e s c r i p t i o n  of foreign aid by Edw a r d  S.
Mason is put forward as:
flA transfer of resources from the government 
or citizens of one country to those of another 
on terms that, from the point of v i e w  of the 
receivers, are easier than could be obtained 
on the capital market. This wo u l d  exclude 
foreign p r i v a t e  inves nent and suppliers* 
credit unless the terms on whi c h  these 
flows w e r e  made available were softened by 
reason of government schemes guaranteeing 
repayment or in other ways absorbing part 
of the risk. It wo u l d  include, of course,
In the private flows, grants, soft loans, 
and technical assistance from foundations,
10
churches, and other charitable Institutions" .
This defi n i t i o n  is m o r e  c o mprehensive than the former* 
ones. It proposes a clear m e a sure to dist i n g u i s h  aid 
from other transfers of resources - i.e. easier terms than 
those available on the capital market. However, it includes 
foreign private investment w h i c h  is softened or g u a r a n ­
teed by a government's repayment, while it neglects the 
modern trend of governments' sponsorship and en c o u r a g e m e n t
%12
of private citizens' overseas investments bo that its 
own development is achieved. This private investment 
cannot be regarded as "foreign a i d”,
As the United Nations is the most important i n t e r ­
national organization, a definition stated by this body
should be considered. The United Nations has defined aid
1 1  
as :
’All transactions {of a country or an 
international organization) which result 
in a permanent net addition to total 
resources available for economic d e v e l o p ­
m e n t  (of another c o u n t r y ) "
A c c o r d i n g  to this definition, the units of aid are 
countries or international organizations. The flow of 
resources takes place between governments (or i n t e r n a ­
tional organizations) * A transaction between individuals 
or a government and an individual Is not considered as 
foreign aid. Once again the d e f inition m a y  be faulted 
as it suggests that aid must produce "a permanent net 
addition to total resources available for economic 
development of another (the aecipient) country"*
A l t h o u g h  m o s t  transactions b e t w e e n  countries and/or 
International organizations usually produce a net ad­
dition to the total resources of the recipient country,
d
this is not always true. The donor may provide the 
recipient country w i t h  resources wh i c h  do not result 
in a p e r manent net addition due to mi s m a n a g e m e n t  and 
misappropriation. For instance, a corrupt government 
m a y  channel its foreign aid into the pockets of its 
p o l i t i c i a n s .
From the above discussion, it is evident that no 
single definition seems to cater for all the aspects 
of foreign aid. 1 propose my definition of foreign aid 
as the transaction of reso rces which consists of the 
following characters; firstly, the donors of aid must 
be governments, international organizations, or political 
groups? s e c o n d l y , from the point of view of the receivers 
the resources are obtained cm terms easier than in capital 
markets,* thirdly, the transfer of resources is intended 
to bring in a net addition to the total resources of the 
recipients, but this outcome is not assured.
Perhaps this d e f inition still does not satisfy 
everybody, but all kinds of aid discussed in this 
dissertation such as m i l i t a r y  aid, economic aid, technical 
and agricultural assistance programmes wh i c h  Co m m u n i s t  
Chinn has extended to A f r i c a  fall w i t h i n  this definition.
'^ V- '- :
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PART II
A i d  As A n  Instrument of Foreign Policy
The reas o n  w h y  a country would give aid to another 
is wo r t h  exploring. In an examination of the studies 
on the motives of foreign aid, we find that they fall 
p r i m a r i l y  into two types:
(a) A i d  with foreign policy; and
(b) A i d  without foreign policy.
The scholars of the first type c o n sider aid aa an i n s t r u ­
m e n t  of foreign pol i c y  to be devised, implemented, and 
evaluated in terms of political c o n c e p t— -its purpose is, 
or ought to be, the attainment of v e r y  specific political, 
i d e o l o g i c a l , and strategic advantages for the donors. The 
protag o n i s t s  of the second point of view cont e n d  that 
the donors should not look for any specific aim or direct 
advantage from aid, they regards aid as an e n d - i n - i t s e l f , 
With regard to this point of view, aid supposedly performs 
the two m a i n  functions of supplementing domestic resources 
and of g e n erating additional domestic resources for the 
development and social transformation of the recipient 
c o u n t r i e s .
(a) Aid with F o r e i g n  Policy
i.jf  i i^
%
: /..
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Professor Hans Morgenthau, E d w a r d  S. Me.son, John
D. Montgomery, Raymond P. M i k e s e l l  are amongst the
' 12 
supporters of the first school of thought . They
argue that aid is r e l ated to national policies or
13
d omestic politics and that foreign aid inay serve
several national objectives ranging from direct economic,
or security, aims to the p r o motion o£ world peace and 
14
st a b i l i t y  , Edw a r d  S, Mason in par t i c u l a r  holds that
the principal purpose of US foreign aid is to promote
15 '
the security of the U n i t e d  States insofar as its 
security is de p e n d e n t  on other countries. This argument 
is supported by the p r a ctices of A m e r i c a n  postwar aid 
polcly. For instance, in the 1940s and the early 1950s 
US aid programmes were largely d e v oted to the r e c o n s t r u c ­
tion and recovery of Western E u r o p e , with a v i e w  to 
p r e venting it from falling into the Communist camp. At 
that time the Independence, de f e n s i b l l i t y  and p r o s p e r i t y
of Western Europe were regarded of crucial importance to
16
th?. security of the United States . The national security 
objectives which encompass foreign aid programmes of the 
United States are also clearly evident in their dealings 
w i t h  Vietnam, Korea* T h a iland and the Republic of China. 
Under the Mutual S e c u r i t y  Programme in the late 1950s, 
where the United States has p r o v i d e d  these countries 
large amounts of assistance designed to enable them to 
m a i n t a i n  a m i l i t a r y  establi s h m e n t  capable of d e a ling w i t h  
actual or threatened aggression which would lead either
16
bo foreign domination, or to domi n a t i o n  by a group under
foreign influence, r e g arded as inimical to US political 
“ 17
and security interests „
:he US aid record shows evidence to support this 
viewpoint. The total request for funds for foreign aid 
of financial year 1964 was $4525 million, of which half 
’•'as allocated to "strategic a s sistance programme" w h i c h  
included m i l i t a r y  aid, supportive assistance, and c o n t i n ­
gency funds. Of this programme, three quarters of the
mi l i t a r y  aid went to nine countries on the p e r i p h e r y  of
18
the Soviet Union and C o m m u n i s t  China borders .
Table. I (see page 1 ?} shows the allo c a t i o n  of US 
foreign aid between 1948-1972. A st'dy of the table 
Indicates that during the Marshall Plan period, US aid 
was m a i n l y  extended to Europe and those eoui^rles 
bo r d e r i n g  on the Soviet bloc. Aid to A f r i c a  ;>A La t i n  
A m e r i c a  only started in 1952, after the r*covnry of 
Europe, and aa the C o l d  War gathered momentum,,
Besides security consideration, aid programmes are 
sometimes a result of straightforward political and/or 
ideological goals. The Americans believe that their 
system and institutions (political, economic and social) 
are bettor than those of other c o u n t r i e s , and have a more 
uni v e r s a l  moral v a l i d i t y  and practical applicability. 
Hence, the United States has an interest in using aid as
an instrument to bring about a conversion of systems
19
amongst recipient countries , and to influence their 
beh a v i o u r  in the international forum. A i d  is also used 
to strengthen A m e r i c a n  cultural and historical ties w i t h  
selected regions and to propagate A m e r i c a n  social modes 
to the recipient countries.
TABLE I
TOTAL US AID EXPENDITURE BY REGION 1948-4972 
(Millions* of Dollars)
U.S.
Fisc?!
year
Near Latin 
East America 
and 
South 
As.io
Viet­
nam
East
Asia
Africa Europe
Marshall Plan 
Period
1948 a
1949
1950
1951 
195?
ir
118
175
179
359 10
1
334
54
31
157 2
192
3,871
3,189
2,596
1,646
1953 298 23 192 3 1,301
1954 260 17 302 7 831
Mutual Security 1955 366 27 129 864 24 566
Acts 1956 387 55 193 634 13 279
Periods 1957 381 66 251 615 19 160
1958 351 65 212 505 41 118
1959 495 87 179 425 81 128
I960 537 96 181 421 147 78
1961 539 119 146 452 178 112
1962 599 285 112 326 200 93
1963 094 316 144 307 157- 37
1964 834 202 158 244 145 19
1965 77*> 430 184 209 175 10
n-i r) 1966 657 495 287b 216 212 1
Period 1967 637 569 468b 219 .189 c1968 530 384 420 144
1969 372 293 397 150
1970 362 431 354 233 186
1971 478 331 386 218 161
1972 37 325 555 543 219 >
Total Assitance 10,631 4,029 4,617 8,318 2,455 15,227
18
Source: U.S. Economic Assistance Programs Administered 
by the Agency for International Development and 
Predecessor Agancies, 3 April 1940 - 30 June 
1972, p. 7
(a) April to June only
(b) Excludes administrative and program support 
costs for Vietnam excluded from the noregional 
data.
(c) I,ess than $5000,000
A i d  programmes are sometimes explained in terms of 
the d o n o r 1s commercial and economic interests. Economic 
arguments are based on the recognition of the growing 
economic interdependence of the w o r l d’s nations. D e ­
v e l o p e d  and d e v e l o p i n g  nations need ever increasing 
markets, if they are to sustain (growth. Xt is argued 
that aid can promote the d o n o r’s exports; it can f a c i l i ­
tate the outreach of donor* s private investors; and it20
can improve its access to needed materials • It is 
therefore in the interest of the developed nations to
assist in facilitating the economic development of the
p o o r  countries, so that their Import capacity for products
from the de v e l o p e d  can likewise Increase.
This kind of economic justification for foreign aid 
was explicitly ex p r e s s e d  by the late U.S. president,
John Kennedy. Referring to the Republic of China, 
Columbia, Israel, Iran and Pakistan, as nations whose 
import patterns had been d r a m a t i c a l l y  affected by 
A m e r i c a n  foreign aid, he said:
These used to be the exclusive m a r k e t  of '
*»,
- «s* *
European c o u n t r i e s ...... too little attention
has been p a i d  to the part wh i c h  an early
exposure to A m e rican goods, Ameri c a n  skills,
and A m e r i c a n  ways of doing things can play
in forming the taste and desires of newly
emerg i n g  countries - --  or to the fact that,
even when our aid ends, and trade relations
last far beyond the termination of our
21
assistance
(b) A i d  without Foreign Policy (The Purist Rationale)
The Purist School * aid given without any specific
o r  direct advantage for the donor country ---  believes
that economic development should in itself be the only
goal and not the aim of foreign policy. This argument
u n doubtedly reassures aid supporters of the moral i t y  and
the importance of their cause. Three aspects of this
22
argument are worth noting : Firstly, the purist 
rationale emphasized the general relationship between 
de v eloped and u n derdeveloped countries and stresses that 
development; is an e x traordinary long-term process.
A c c o r d i n g  to this argument, the case of aid typically 
phrased in terms of foreign needs rather than donor's 
purposes. A  second key p r oposition in the purist rationale 
is that economic development assistance should, as one 
m e m o r a n d u m  states It, "be treated as separate and independent
^  w  *  "
20
from the short-term political and economic goals w h i c h
both donors and recipients pursue as a matter of im-
23
mediate national advantage" . Thirdly, the supporters 
of this argument also state that not only the economic 
development should be pursued indepen d e n t l y  of political 
goals but that economic d e velopment is the only legitimate 
goal in economic assistance.
However, this Idealized vi e w p o i n t  or aid held by the 
p urists seldom happens in practice. In fact a g o v ernment 
aid programme often needs to be directed towards specific 
objectives wh i c h  can bo achieved wit h i n  p a r ticular periods. 
Otherwise aid programmes cannot gain support from the 
political leaders of the donor countries,, and are deem e d  
to be unsuccessful.
It is also unrealistic to separate aid p r o grammes from 
short-term political and economic goals, F o r  I n s t a n c e „ 
a number of provisions are included into the U.S. A i d  A c t  
to prevent aid from go i n g  d i r ectly or indirectly to 
politically unacceptable countries. In the 1962 l e g i s ­
lation, a section was added ---* the so-called Hicke n l o o p e r
A m e n d m e n t— which requires the president to suspend a s s i s ­
tance to the government of any country which nation a l i z e s  or
24
expropriates US property w i t h o u t  adequate c o m p e n s a t i o n  .
French aid policy also clearly reflects the r e ­
lationship between aid and political aims. This is
» m ,  i 'f J 4 1 I i j , ' "1 i i w  %n« ' j r  v
- v . ■*
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depleted by the fact that Its aid has been e x c lusively
co n centrated in its former colonies for the p u r pose to
m a i n t a i n  F r e n c h  influence w i t h i n  these former countries
In a similar fashion, the rapidly increasing Japan e s e
aid has been directly tied bo the efforts of the Tokyo
gove r n m e n t  to exten-1 Japanese commerce and investment 
26
in Asia ,
H u m a n i t a r i a n  motive is sometimes c l a i m e d  as a
reason of aid in the second category. As President
J o h nson e x p ressed in his A i d  Message to C o n gress of
J a n u a r y  14, 1965:
For our security and well-being, and as
responsible free men, we m u s t  seek to
share our c a p acity for growth and the
promise of a better life, w i t h  our fellow
men around the world. That is w h a t  foreign
27
aid is all about .
25
President Eisenhowers also stated this attitude in 
his letter to the Congress on the Mutual Security P r o ­
gramme for the fiscal year 1960 (AID, A g e n c y  of I n t e r n a ­
tional Development) as follows:
We have had as our goal the promotion 
of peaceful change for m i l lions of people 
in Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East 
who are seeking domestic t r a nquility and
1&%"'~'' " m s r - '  ■ x b ^ t x ^ r  r
/-
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a better way of life. We have responded, 
to the hope of these m i l lions for a decent 
future for themselves and their children 
through w e l l - c o n v i n c e d  programmes of e c o n o ­
mic and technical assistance.... Our common 
safety has been of equal concern....
Altho u g h  both of these two statements indicate the
concern of humanitarian reason, they do not exclude a
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  of US national security. Furthermore,
h u m a n i t a r i a n i s m  itself has become s e l f - r e w a r d i n g : it
has strengthened the U S voice and Influence in the in- 
“ 28 
ternational forum ,
Besides the two categories m e n t i o n e d  above, a third
category with regard to the purposes of aid is presented
by the o r ganization for Economic Coope r a t i o n  and Develop
w e n t  (OECD) in Paris. A c c o r d i n g  to OECD, aid is given to
m a i n t a i n  a viable global system wh i c h  is aimed at: the
improvement of mankind's shared interest in peace, and
29
the prevention of a nuclear holocaust . This school of 
thought m a y  be initially seen as differing from the 
former two, but a closer e x amination reveals that it is 
actually similar to the first category, as it aims to 
build a world of "mutual interest" which, needless to s a y ? 
is a wor l d  suitable for the donor country.
Finally, George L i s k a 's observations on aid add
s m & k
>V ^  ■
' m q * r - y r '  W ^ f
v>
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considerable weight to the argument that foreign aid is 
an instrument of foreign policy"
F o r e i g n  aid is an instrumenv of foreign 
policy. In the Cold War, foreign aid is 
u s u ally used as a w e a p o n  of economic war.
During the t h e rmonuclear stalemate, the 
total w a r  is retreated as a technique 
for resolving conflicts and economic war 
has s u bstituted the total war. Economic 
war does not o n l y  p e r form the same function- 
to test relative strength and capacity to 
use strength in the national interest; it 
also is able to achieve the same result 
as total war - complete control of one state 
over another based upon a decisive superiority 
in power and c a p a b i l i t y . . , , .Economic war b e ­
tween the two superpowers {USA and USSR) takes 
place within two concentric circles. The 
Inner circle is the competitive rate of 
economic and technical g r o w t h . The outer 
circle represents their ability to stimulate 
the economic growth of other c o u n t r i e s , 
chiefly the allied and otherwise related ones. 
Thro u g h  these, they can compete in international 
or g anization such as United Nations. And
Foreign aid is easily used as an instrument
30 '
in w i n n i n g  the war .
~ vh “* r  t x
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PART XIX
The Nature of Communist China's Aid,
If aid is always pe r f o r m e d  as an instrument of 
foreign policy by the W e s t e r n  countries, then the 
attitude of C o m munist Ch i n a  in ext e n d i n g  aid to other 
countries will not be an exception to the norm. H o w ­
ever, since C o m munist China does not disclose its real 
intention on e x t ending aid to other countries and since 
C o m munist China is a memb e r  of Socialist camp, it is 
advisable to understand Communist China's attitude 
towards aid within the context of M a r x i s m - L e n i n i s m s .
Socialist writers always insist that the character 
of the economic and commercial relations b e t ween d e ­
veloping countries and socialist countries is different 
from that between d e v eloping countries and economically 
a dvanced W e s tern nations. They assert that they do not 
seek any special advantages in extending aid. Leo n i d  
Brezhnev, for example, stated that "the Soviet Union does 
not look for advantages, does not hunt for concessions,
does not seek political domination, and is not after
31
m i l i t a r y  bases ". A n o t h e r  Socialist writer, Arnost 
Tauber, also points out that:
"The socialist countries consider it a 
mor a l  obligation to aid the young nations
*
in their struggle for political and
%
*'»sk
economic independence. They believe that 
mutual economic cooperation produces new 
elements and factors which accelerate 
the development of the countries of Africa- 
Asia and L a t i n  America, increase the d y ­
namics of their progress, and paralize the 
m o n o p o l y  of the developed Western countries
as main suppliers of the means of p r o d u c t i o n
32
and as creditors ".
These socialists try to convince people that the
"moral o b l i g a t i o n” is the reason behind socialist
countries' assistance to the T h i r d  World. However, their
arguments are not altogether convincing when we consider
the fact that the Soviet Union's economic policy towards
its ’■ powerful allies has been as imperialistic as
anything devised by the most avaricious firms in the
33
West towards the developing countries . M a r shall I. 
Goldman's study reveals that the most Important c o n s i ­
deration underlying Soviet aid policy is that of politl-
34
cal self-interest * He argues that all Soviet economic 
relations with the less d e v eloped countries are subservient 
to political calculations* It is only when c o n fronted with 
compe t i t i o n  for prestige or influence that the Russians 
w i l l  respond w i t h  any m e a ningful assistance* Soviet aid 
to Communist China suggests that self-interest rather 
than m o r a l  obligation was the decisive reason for the
26
Soviet Union to extend aid to Peking. It is also argued
that Soviet aid decisions towards Afr i c a  are shaped
with a view to gaining strategic benefits: bases, landing
and resupply rights, and access to strategic raw m a t erials
for itself and/or denial of such benefits to its m i l i t a r y
35
rivals . Leo n i d  Brezhnev's comment on Soviet aid to 
A fr i c a  that "the Soviet Union fully supports the l e g i t i ­
mate aspirations of young states, their determination to
36
put an end to all imperialist exploitation " implies 
that to eradicate W e s tern Influence in the T h i r d  Wor l d  
is the objective of Soviet aid policy.
Therefore, we can clearly d i s c e r n  that in the minds 
of the policy makers of socialist countries, of which 
Communist China is one, foreign aid policy is designed to 
advance their own political interests in the recipient 
countries. so as to gain superiority in a polarized world. 
The moral explanation is mer e l y  a ruse for their own real 
I n t e n t i o n s .
A lthough moral approach is rejected by Western
scholars as the unique or maj* r reason of Socialist
aid undertaking, Western scholars do not think that
p olitical purposes are the only benefits socialist
countries want to achieve. They believe that economic
or trade considerations are among the reasons for
socialist aid policy. Marshall I. Goldman and John D .
37 '
Esseks arc two of them . An A f r ican scholar, G . Munin,
%
- T -  -  V  w r~ ***\gm "figgor-?' <Tn$r'r '«ygyr^r
. s  * /  "■ .• ■ i^r
27
also holds the same opinion. He says:
"While it would be rather impossible to
state whether the socialist bloc is purely
political m o t i v a t e d  in its expansion of
trade w i t h  and extantion of financial and
technical aid to Africa in particular,
and d e v eloping areas in general, or whether
economic considerations are the predominant
motives, it is safe, however, to conclude
that both of these factors tmter into the
38
decision making ".
If economic explanation suits the Soviet Union's aid 
policies, it does not necessarily have the same implication 
for Communist C h i n a’s aid policies, because China is an 
agricultural country, its econ o m y  does not depend on trade 
or foreign resources to the extent that the Soviet U n i o n’s 
does. We cannot deny that in some cases Communist C h i n a , 
like other socialist countries, does gain economic benefits 
from its aid recipient countries, but in m o s t  cases it 
gets little or no economic reward at, all, after spending 
large sums of money on countries of w h i c h  some are even 
better-off than it is. If it wants to seek economic 
benefits from aid-giving, it will not pay in most cases.
A. typical case is its aid to Tanzania and Zambia to build 
a railroad linking these two countries. It invested more 
than $400 million, out of wh i c h  the economic benefit is its
W T  *” CW
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access to Zambia's c o p p e r , w h i c h  is apparently out of 
p r o portion to the cost it expended. From this we can 
assume that economic considerations, if there are any, 
form only a minor motive in Communist China's aid 
policies. Political considerations are the primary 
intention.
John D, Montgomery is one of the scholars who holds 
the viewpoint that, Communist China gives aid to achieve 
political aims. He says that:
For the United States, promoting a peaceful 
and just w o r l d  order is a major aim of 
foreign policy, and foreign aid has been 
used since its inception in hope of m i n i ­
mizing causes of wo r l d  tension. The USSR 
and ^specially China (Communist), of the 
other hand, have offered strategic aid in 
order to increase tension because funda­
mental change is essential to achieve the 
desired communist world order ... their 
aid devotes special attention to finding 
ways to increase the scope of government 
enterprise, to support mass movements, and
to encauraere the industrialization of agri-
39 ’
cultural activity along Soviet lines .
This argument is a valuable pointer toward an under-
’C
standing of Communist China's rationale behind it of
%
foreign aid. Once again, it is important to note that
since all Communist China's policies are subordinate
to political considerations and objectives, so is its
aid policy. Since it is the declared objective of
Communist China to "bury c a p italism and communize the
40 '
whole world" , Chinese Communists do not hesitate to use
foreign aid as a means to this end.
t & U g * -  *  ■
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CHAP T E R  TWO 
The Roots of Communist China's Aid Policy
PART 1
Chinese Historical Background '
The origins of C o m munist C h i n a’s foreign aid policy '■
lie in Chinese historical background. As Robert G.
Wesson points out, in the formation of a foreign policy
the "makers of the foreign poli c y  are guided largely by ;
' 1 . 
the experience of the past. " This is p a r t i c u l a r l y  true
for an ancient society like Chinese in w h i c h  tradition has
played an important role in the formation of its f o r eign '
2 . ■ : 
p o l i c y  . Professor King C , Chen also argues that
"It seems Impossible that after some 2600
years of cultural continuity, a revolutionary
regime like the one (Communist China) could
completely reject tradition.... It is quite ,
obvious that Chinese tradition has played
a significant role in the conduct of
3 ■
Chinese foreign policy. "
"In order to unde r s t a n d  the continuity 
and change of Chinese foreign policy one 
must equip himself with the background of
traditional system of Chinese foreign ’
4 * ,
r e l a t i o n s . "
%35
The traditional system of Chinese foreign relations
w i t h  other countries is based on the thought of the
w o r l d  order of Sino-Centrism and the practice of
5
tributary sys t e m  . Before China had contact w i t h
Western countries, China's foreign relations were limited
to its n e i ghbouring countries. This is a central theme
in the formation of Sinocentristic World Order. Since
Ch i n a  was superior to its neighbours culturally and
was Isolated from the West geographically, the belief in
6
a Sinocentric World O r d e r  developed .
Culturally, the societies of East Asla-China, Korea,
Vietnam, Japan and the small island K i n g d o m  of L i u -Chiu
(Ryukyu) have all stemmed from Ancient China and developed
7
with i n  the Chinese culture orbit . in Chinese terminology,
8
China is a cultural rather than a territorial concept r 
hence the cultural influence is of obvious 
significance in traditional Chinese wo r l d  order. As 
early as Chau Dynasty (1112-247 B . C , ) the Chinese believed 
they w e r e  combined together under one culture and regarded
9
other peoples outside the Chinese civilisation as barbarians . 
The fact i*.hat Chinese Culture was superior to its surrounding 
nomadic tribes - i.e, Jung in the west, Yee in the east,
Dee in the north and Man in the south - enabled China 
to spread outwards from north China by absorbing the 
surrounding territories, mainly the southern territory,
Ihls superiority was supported by her size, age and wealt.ou
During the long period, of ancient Chinese history, except
for a very short period., China was the major power in
10
East Asia, and hence the center of East Asia World .
Besides cultural superiority, natural geographical 
barriers assisted in the formation of the Sinocentric 
world order. Geographically, China is guarded on the 
west by almost endless deserts; on the southwest by the 
Himalayan Mountains; and on the east by vast oceans.
This geographical isolation cut China off from other 
centers of civilisations and left it free from the chal­
lenges of the outer world. This geographical isolation 
made Chinese feel that the world they knaw and dealt 
with was the only existant world.
The Sinocentric world order did not onl} prevail du>-
ring China's period of military superiority buc continued
during the invasion of China. In Chinese history, China
was only twice subjected to foreign administration, ".‘he
first time was during the Mongal Dynasty (1279-1367 A.D.),
and the second one was during the Ching Dynasty (1644-1911),
Although these two foreign regimes conquered China by force,
they did not alter Chinese tradition and culture, but rather 
were themselves absorbed into the Chinese culture. This
fact reinforced the Sinocentric world ord. r.
%37
Within this world order, Chinese emperors regarded
themselves as "Tien-tzu" - the sons of Heaven - to
govern "Tien-hsia" (all under Heaven) which embraced the
whole world including everything outside of China (Chung­
’ 12 
kuo, the Central State or the Middle Empire) , and a set
13
of assumptions were formed :
(1) The Chinese internal order was applied 
bo the international field. As the Chinese 
considered themselves as the center of the 
world, international intercations were seen 
as internal affairs. Hence, the world order 
reflected China’s internal order-it was hierar­
chical , not egalitarian. The concept of equality, 
or the sovereignty of individual political
units in the world order did not exist. All 
political units arranged themselves hierarchically, 
China was at the apex of the hierarchy and 
therefore the central authority of the world.
(2) The world hierarchy was universal. There 
were no other hierarchies and no other sources 
of power on the international scene. Because 
of the absence of alternative powers, no con­
cept of the "balance of power" ever developed 
in Chinese minds. All units within the 
system were subservient to China, and those 
political units which were geographically too
distant to participate simply lived in a 
kind of limbo, or international political 
vacuum, and had more freedom in their own 
affairs,
(3) China's centrality in the world order
was a function of its civilization and virtue, 
particularly the virtue of the Chinese rulers. 
The world order was as much an ethical as 
a political phenomenon. Harmony on the 
international scene, as on the domestic, 
was the product of the emperor's virtue.
(4) Nation,-,I. -,'awet- was the reflection of 
nr.r..Wr»a:L virtue. Power was a result derived 
from ’ !n» , assession of virtue. "Right" and
»«*«r* synonymous. According to Chinese 
ph,tU)!r '•"■mets, e.g. Confucius and Menchu, "might 
could not produce "right", conversely "right" 
could produce "might". Hence the use of might 
was justified by the very existence of right; 
without right there was no might.
(5) International society was an extension 
of the Internal society. Since China was the 
center of the world and Tien-tzu was the 
ruler of the whole world, "international" or
"interstates" concepts did not exist. What 
boundaries there were, were cultural.
(6) The principle of the interaction between 
China and the "barbarian'' was lai-hwa (come and 
be transformed by the superior blessings of 
Chinese civilization). China's philosophy
was that Lai-hwa had to be carried voluntarily 
rather than compulsorily. If the barbarian 
did not like to Lai-hwa, then they could remain 
uncivilized,
(7) Since the Lai-hwa was voluntary, if non- 
Chinese rulers wanted to participate in the 
Chinese world order, they had to observe the 
appropriate forms and ceremony (Li) in their 
contacts with Chinese emperors.
According to the concept of the Slnocentrlc World 
Order and hence world order, a tributary system was 
giadually formulated. This system was instituted during 
Ming (1368-1644 A.D.) and Ching (1644-1911 A.D,) dynasties
Under this system the tribute-presenting countries 
sent envoys or lings to present tributes to Chinese court 
in acknowledgment of the Sinocentrlc World Order. To 
carry out this tributary system certain procedures had
H fp g *  /-• ipr ‘
to be followed- During the Ching Dynasty, the following
15
procedures had to be met and practised :
(1) Non-Chinese rulers were given a patent 
of appointment and an official seal for use 
in correspondence,
(2) They were given a noble rank in the 
Ching1s hierarchy,
(3) They dated their communications by the 
Ching c calendar, that is, by the Ta-ching 
dynastic reign-title.
(4) They presented tribute memorials of 
various sorts on appropriate statutory occasions.
(5) They also presented a symbolic tribute
of local products. ■
(6) They or their envoys, were escorted to 
court by the Imperial officials.
(7) They performed the appropriate ceremonies 
of Ching court, notably the kotow*
(8) They received imperial gifts in return.’
(9) They were granted certain privileges 
of trade at the frontier and at the capital.
(10) The tributary missions had fixed fre­
quency and routes to China. Table 2-1 
shows the regular Ching's tributaries in 
the order listed in 1818 edition of the 
Collected Statutes (Ta~Chlng~hui-tien) , 
together with the expected frequency and 
routes of tribute missions.
Table 2-t 
Ching Tributaries as of 1818
COUNTRY FREQUENCY OF MISSIONS ROUTE
Tribute four times a year presented via Mukden and 
nil together at the end of the year Shanhaikuan 
Tribute once every other year via Foochow
Tribute once in two years, sending via Chen-nan-kuan 
an envoy to court once in four years and Kwangsi 
to present two tributes together 
Tribute once in ten years via Yunnan
Tribute once in three years via Canton
Tribute once in five years or more via Amoy 
Tribute at no fixed period; the old via Canton 
regulations were for tribute once 
in five years
Tribute once, in ten years via Yunnan
Tribute at no fixed periods via Macao
Papacy, England)
Korea
LiU'-ch1 iu 
Annam
Laos
Siam
Sulu
Holland
Burma
Western Ocean 
(Portugal, the
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This tribute was regarded by Chinese emperors as a
symbol of Li (ceremony) rather than an economic token.
Chieng-lung, an emperor of Ching dynasty, once explictly
expressed this attitude towards the British envoy Lord
Macartney. Be said that his empire "does not value rare
and precious things .».. nor do we have the slightest
16
need of your iLord Macartney) country’s manufactures ".
Therefore when Chinese emperors received tribute goods
from foreign envoys, they often gave these envoys imperial
gifts in return and the imperial gifts bestowed in return
17
were usually more valuable than the tribute goods , In 
the emperors' minds, doing business with foreigners was 
a favour to foreigners, hence they usually permitted 
foreign merchants accompanied by envoys to do trade with 
Chinese at the frontier. However, the Chinese insisted 
that the foreign envoys had to observe the Li which tri­
butary countries had to obey in dealing with the "son of 
the heaven".
Simply, the functions of tribute system can be seen 
from the viewpoint of the tribute-presenting countries 
or from that of the Chinese. From the point of view of 
the tribute-presenting states, commercial relations be­
came inseparately bound up with tributary system. Trade 
was conducted by the merchants who accompanied the tri­
butary envoys, or at times by the envoys themselves.
Since commei'cial benefit was one of the major reasons
behind, dealing with China and, since tribute-presentation 
was an available pretext for trade with China, the 
tributary system became a necessary formality for Chinese 
trading partners whilst China itself considered it a 
politically defensive action. Dr. T.P, Tslang described 
this interaction as follow
"That dogma (tributary system) asserts 
national security could only be found in 
isolation and stipulates that whoever 
wished to enter into relations with China 
must do so as Chinese vassal, acknowledging 
the supremacy of the Chinese emperor and 
obeying his commands, thus ruling out all 
posibtllty of International intercourse on 
terms of equality".
"Chinese statesmen before the latter part 
of the Nineteenth century would have ridi­
culed the notion that the national finance 
and wealth should be or could be promoted 
by means of international trade. On China's 
part the permissl n to trade was intended to 
be a mark of imperial bounty and a means of
keeping the barbarians in the proper state1 8
of submissiveness ".
This practice continued until China's defeat by '
<mF"
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Britain in the Opium War and the signing of the Nanking 
Treaty in 1842. For the first time China was forced to 
accept negotiated terms such as consular jurisdiction, 
negotiated tariffs, extraterritoriality and so on. After 
Nanking Treaty China was forced to renounce its traditional 
privileges and authority over its former tributary states 
Korea, Burma, Siam, all of •ndo-China and so on.
Despite having to forego its traditional standpoint,
China continues to use traditional notion as a basis
for its modern foreign policies and continues tc, strive
’  19
for the past glories of China . As China has been under
Western oppression for nearly a century, suffering the
humiliation imposed by the West, a strong feeling has
emerged in support of the revival of China’s glory.
Mao Tse-Tung’s words "China is not an independent country,
20
it is a semi-colonial country " and that "It is evident
that whoever can overthrow imperialism he can get people's 
21
support ” have geuerated strong support amongst the
Chinese people for a change in China’s international
status. Aid, in Chinese traditional thinking, is an
Instrument to display donors1 virtue and generosity, hence
its present aid may be seon as a vague attempt by Mao to
restore. China’s historical style of relations with other
22
countries , particularly the traditional tributary 
states. This explanation is illustrated in Communist 
China's aid to the Aslan countries which were historically
tribute-bearing states. When Communist China initiated 
its aid programmes, aid was first sent to neighbouring 
states with which it had once carried out tribute re­
lations. These countries, North Korea, Vietnam, Mongolia, 
Cambodia, Burma and Nepal - have been all the largest 
recipients of Communist China's aid.
The impact of Chinese history on its aid policy can 
be perceived from the intercourse between Communist China 
and its aid recipient countries. Although Peking has 
sent a large number of aid missions abroad, and its 
diplomatic representation abroad is usually large, the 
greater portion of the aid agreements have been signed 
in Peking. This reflects the past tribute system. Many 
heads of states have visited Peking, and many have re­
ceived promises of aid for their politeness. Apart from 
the one visit Mao Tse-tung made to Moscow, he remained in 
China during his 30-year reign. This reflects the tra­
ditional Chinese Tributary system where only foreign 
kings visited China whilst the Chinese emperor remained 
in China.
Another feature which reflects the. tribute missions
of the past relates to the important diplomatic business
which is carried out during aid missions, or when grants
23
or loa,ns are made „ To the Chinese this is the ideal 
framework in which cultural exchanges, alliances, border 
settlements, etc., are discussed. The granting of aid
r <jgr
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also involves considerable fanfare and ritual, as was
24
true of the tribute missions . It is through this 
fanfare and ritual that the credibility of the authority 
of Chinese leadership is seen to be depicted.
Other similarities which may be compared are;
Tribute missions represented exchanges of loyalty and 
friendship and enhanced the prestige of ruling groups on 
both sides* Similarly visits to Peking by heads of 
state provide a measure of legitimacy and favourable 
publicity for Mao and his associates, as do return visits 
by Chinese diplomats to the guest countries. The tribute 
missions were more beneficial to the tribute bearers than 
to the Chinese because what China stressed was the 
superior position of China, rather than her commercial 
interests;!. Presently Chinese aid is given on quite 
generous terms by International standards. Foreign aid 
provides an avenue for the export of Chinese products.
A large portion of Communist China’s aid has been in 
the form of Chinese products or credit to purchase Chinese
%
gocds, rather than in foreign currency. This Is perhaps 
due to Communist China's shortage of foreign exchange. 
However, tribute missions that visited China were given 
Chinese products which represented the advanced nature 
of Chinese culture, civilization, science and general 
achievement. Today, Communist China offers many aid 
projects, such ao railroad construction and agricultural 
production, which are meant to demonstrate Chinese
1
technical skills. At present, Communist China particularly
favours road and railroad projects. This is perhaps
because of the fact that foreigners once built these
in China, and Communist China wants to do the same to
25
prove its ability .
Prom the comparisons mentioned above, Communist China's 
aid appears to be motivated much by political aims which 
originate from Chinese historical background.
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PART XI
The Ideology of Chinese Communists
The second root of Communsit China's foreign aid 
is Communist ideology. Before we go further to discuss 
the implication of Chinese Communslts Ideology for its aid 
policy, it is necessary for us to have a brief look at 
the effect of ideology on a country's foreign policy.
As people are "thinking beings", ideologies play a 
central role in their behavioural patterns. Various 
definitions of ideology are put forward: Franz Schurmann 
defines ideology as a set of ideas which can be classified 
as pure ideology nd practical ideology. He says, "pure 
Ideology is a set of ideas designed to give the individual 
a unified and conscious world view; practical Ideology
is a set of ideas designed to give the individual rational
26
instruments for actions ." According to this viewpoint, 
ideology provides people with the ability to acknowledge 
the world and the motivation to act. In his book Ideology 
and Discontent , David K. Aptor argues that ideology plays 
two major functions: Firstly, it is to bind the society 
together; and secondly, it is to satisfy Individual 
personality formatl'~vu The first function, the function of 
solidarity, is to build solidarity in a, society through 
shared emotions concerning equally valued ideas and objects,
» •
The second function, usually called the function of identity, 
serves to make the idividual aware of his own social position and
• (Ip l->
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the mission implicit in it. It is defined as "an uncon­
scious tendency underlying religious and scientific as 
well as political thought; the tendency at a given time 
to make fact amenable to ideas and ideas to facts, in 
order to create a world image, convincing enough to
27
support the collective, and individual sense of Identity 
This argument clearly indicates that ideology has an 
Important influence in the forma!, a on of a person's 
political beliefs.
The role of ideology is further described as a
comprehensive function of binding a country together
psychologically; as it provides scale cf values by which
its people may know what to strive ’ or and wlw.t: ;o reject;
enabling them to make sense of an 'fchecwiye bewildering
world thev inhabit, and to justify a government's efforts “ 28 . . .  
to grapple with it .
However, the influence of ideology to a country's
policy is through the process of selection by the
individuals who are in a position to make policy. It
is said that the Ideology of political leaders helps to
determine both the methods that they adopt and the goals
29
that they pursue in foreign policy . Since all foreign 
policy makers are usually confronted with more information 
than they can possibly employ in making decisions, they 
need to select Information according to some criteria of
W  a .
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relevance or importance . They often exclude information
that does not agree with their current conceptions or
reinterpret it so that it agrees with their current
30
conceptions . Decision- making becomes a process in 
which decision-makers choose the information and embark on 
the course of action they want to pursue or to preserve 
what they value. The measure they use in choosing infor­
mation and making decision is their attitude towards things
and their evaluation of things, or what is known as "their 
ideology",
In China, the effect of ideology in shaping foreign
policy is possibly more embracing than in other countries.
According to Professor E\R. May's analysis, there are
two kinds of foieign policy, a calculated one and an
31 *
axiomatic one . A calculated policy, Professor E.R, May 
explains, is a specific policy based on a careful analysis 
of the ends desired and the means available to achieve 
them. An axiomatic policy, on the other hand, is broad, 
long-range , and is less clearly definable in terms of 
a specific set of variables. It is a more abstract 
definition of the ends-moans equation, derived from a 
multitude of source, including national experience, deeply 
rooted in history and the broad nati r'al interest as 
conceived at the movement. It Includes the broader 
intellectual assumptions about the nature of international 
society or the international order held by the policy - 
makers themselves as well as their own intepretation of 
international and national history. In other words, a
%
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calculated foreign policy is more scientific and reason­
able; an axiomatic foreign policy is less scientific and 
more emotional.
Of these, two types of foreign policy, ideology has more
influence on an axiomatic policy since Ideology is a set
of ideas v/hich is analogous to assumptions rather than
to calculated analyses ommunist China's foreign policy
tends to lend Itself towards an axiomatic description
rather than a calculated description» According to
Thomas Robinson’s study, it is doubtful whether Mao
Tse-tung, the most important decision-: aker of Communist
China, understood the prevailing environment when making
32
decisions . Philip L. Bridgham claims that Mao's per­
' 33 
caption of reality was "simplistic and distorted" .
Edward Friedman and Mark Selden also believe that Chinese
leaders generally did not see the world as it was when
34
they made decisions before 19 71 , Indications of this 
disregard for the "prevailing environment" are the laun­
ching of the Great Leap Forward and the Great Cultural 
Revolution, The Great Leap Forward of 1958 seemed to 
Ignore the prevailing economic climate of that time, 
but launched itself on the emotional support of the
people of Communist China. It later proved to be an
35
economic disaster . The Great Cultural Revolutionf 
often described as a "big catastrophe" by several Chinese 
leaders, again depicts a policy made on emotional grounds.
I
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These two examples suggest Communist China,’ s policy tend
i-.o be axiomatic rather than calculated, as "there is a
very low correlation between international reality and
36
Peking’s perception of it ", As an axiomatic policy
maker, Communist China displays a greater and larger
dependency on ideology as a platform in its international
behaviour, and its decision-makers use Communist ideology
ho shape their world outlook and formulate their policy
37
whilst justifying their international activities .
The People's Republic of China has Communism as its
Ideological base, with the implication that this Ideology
38
has a decisive influence on its foreign aid policies .
The core content of Communism is the so-called "materialism"r 
i,o , the main motivation of human progress is materialistic. 
This materialistic interpretation of history is clearly 
described by Mao Tse-tung:
"The history of man compromises the history 
of his struggle with nature, the history of 
class struggle, the history of science.
Owing to the necessity to live and struggle, 
men have thought about the reality of mat­
ters and its laws, have proved the correct­
ness of materialism and have found the 
necessary intellectual tool for their strug­
gle «—  materialist philosophy. The higher 
the level to which social production develops,
53
•%
%
the greater the development of the class 
struggle t and the more scientific know­
ledge reveals the secret of nature, the
greater the development and consolidation
39
of materialist philosophy'' .
According to the materialistic explanation of history,
two structures exist in a society;a superstructure and -
a sub-structure. The superstructure includes political,
intellectual, legal institutions, while the sub-structure is
the economic conditions of the society. The sub-structure
supports the superstructure. With an economic change,
the political, legal and 11teratural institutions will
40 •
have to adjust to this change .
41
As Chinese Communism accepts Marxist doctrine , 
the principles of materialism naturally have sorr-s influ­
ence on Peking's foreign policy. Economic forces are
seen as being largely responsible for polictical and
’ 42
historical trends and even specific events , Hence
Communist China's foreign aid policies may be seen as an
extension of this premise - i.e. by altering the economic
structure of a country it would alter, or affect its
political structure. (Chinese Communists believe that
as they are able to purchase prestige from their former
tributary states with the aid, it is possible that they
will be able to purchase other aims, with aid, from other
states.) A supportive example is Communist China's aid to
other Communist countries where solidarity is purchased through
a common bond of ideology. As Communist China has affections on
Communist bloc, it likes to see Hie solidarity of Communist
countries This feeling becomes particularly strong when a
communist country is in danger of, or under attack from,
Democratic group. Communist China's aid to North Korea and
Vietnam was partly based on the consideration that they all
belonged to the same ideological family.. Its aid to Hungary
in the mid-1950s showed similar tendency where Mao Tse-tung43
be1ieved the Communist country was being threatened .
Communist China not only employs aid to contribute to 
the consolidation of the Communist bloc, frequently it also 
uses aid to win ideological allies. For example, when the 
Soviet Union cut its aid and withdrew its technicians from 
China in 1960 as a result of the Sino-Soviet ideological 
schism, Albania was likewise considered a rebel by Moscow.
The Kremlin also resorted to economic pressure against the 
Albanian government to force it to return to the Soviet 
ideological camp. Since Peking and Albania were in agree­
ment in their ideological differences with Moscow, Peking 
promised to give Albania aid in 196 1 with the purpose to
prevent a change in Albanian ideological commitment through
44 '
Soviet economic pressure .
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Another important feature of Chinese Communist 
ideology in the context of .  ^ aid policy is the con" 
cept of anti-imperialism or anti’-capitalism. From a 
Communist viewpoint, capitalism constitutes the source 
of all evil. In a capitalist system, the owners of the 
means of production (the bourgeoisie) are said to dominate. 
They employ workers and pay them so little that exploi­
tation occurs. They control the state and use it both 
at home, and abroad to defend and advance their class 
interest. At home they add political oppression to their 
economic exploitation whenever it is necessary to do so. 
Abroad they become imperialists. They believe that 
contradictions rtxi.~ts within the capitalist system and 
these contradictions within the capitalist system doom it 
to destruction* It is the Communist belief that they 
must organize and work to bring about the inevitable 
destruction of capitalism. As they see it, they are the 
agents of history, giving effect to its ineluctable laws.
They must be willing to use any means available to realize
45
this end . Chinese Communists share this viewpoint.
From its beginnings the Chinese Communist Party’s primary 
foreign policy preoccupation has been with the issue of 
imperialism. Because of the oppression by Western im­
perialists in the past, combating imperialism has been
46
seen as a major task of Communist revolution , Mao Tse- 
tung explained the role of anti-imperialism in China's 
internal resolution as follows: .
ii nrffi im T iimirif  i
"These two great tasks (to carry out a 
national revolution to overthrow foreign 
imperialist oppression and to overthrow 
feudal landlord oppression) are interrela­
ted. Unless imperialist rule is overthrown, 
the rule of the feudal landlord class can­
not be terminated, because imperialist 
is its main support. Conversely, unless 
help is given to the peasants in their 
struggle to overthrow the feudal landlord 
class, it will be impossible to build 
powerful revolutionary contingents to over­
throw imperialist rule, because the feudal 
landlord class is the main social base of 
imperialist rule in China and the peasantry
*7
is the main force in the Chinese revolution "
Since Peking genuinely perceives the world as being
engaged in prolonged, continuous and intense revolutionary
48 '
struggle , Chinese Communists have reacted to anti­
imperialism not only Internally, but also Internationally.
As soon as the Chinese Communist Party had seized power 
in China, they immediately, and enthusiastically, endorsed 
the current Soviet perception of a world sharply divided 
into two hostile camps. They claimed that
"The world today has been divided into two 
mutually antagonistic camps: on the on hand.
57
the world imperialist camp, composed, of 
American imperialists and their accomplices, 
the reactionaries of all countries of the 
world? on the other hand, the anti­
Imperialist camp, composed of the Soviet 
Union and the New Democracies of Ea^cern 
Europe, and the National Liberation move­
ments in China, Southeast Asia and Greece, 
plus the people’s democratic forces of 
all countries of the world, American 
imperialism has become the bastion of 
all the reactionary forces in the world? 
while the Soviet Union has become the
bastion of all progressive forces.,.
49
In his article "On the People's Democratic Dictator­
ship", Mao Tse-tung disclosed that China was to "lean to 
one side", namely to the Soviet Union, and to participate 
in an international united front based on an alliance
among China, the Soviet Union, and other Communist states
50
in order to spearhead the world revolutionary struggle .
In another speech, he also asserted that the socialist
system would replace the capitalist system in the end
51
and that revolutionaries would eventually triumph .
Chinese Communists not only applied the anti-imperia­
list posture internally but also in their foreign policy
UPf* ■^r t* -Tpgr^ -
s. •C : **■>
58
they regard, the Chinese revolution as a model for Communist
revolutions. As early as 1950 Liu Shao-chi insisted that
the road taken by China should be followed by all people
of colonial and semi-colonial countries so that they
52
could achieve their independence . In a speech to the 
Chinese Communist party, Deng Xiao-ping, the former 
Secretary General of C.C,P. stated that
"The Chinese Revolution is a component part 
of the socialist revolution of the world 
proletariat. It is a continuation of the 
great October Revolution..... It is an 
extremely heavy blow to the Imperialist 
system. Victorious new China joined the
Socialist camp.. ...... . and greatly
added to the ascendancy of the world so­
cialist system..... the Chinese people have 
carried the anti-imperialist and anti- 
feudal democratic revolution to the end.... 
This cannot but tremendously inspire all 
the oppressed nations in their struggle for
liberation, people's democracy and a
53
socialist future ".
They also regard themselves as the most likely force 
to liberlize the world and have called for world revolution.
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"According to the principle mentioned above,
Communists in all oppressed nacions, which
are imperialist, are firmly against their
national rulers - they are an imperialist
group, and exert every possible way to
help the liberation movements in all colo­
' 54 
nial and semi-colonial area ".
;!
"All oppressed nations, proletariats, and 
all people's democratic forces must unite 
together; ...... 'with new democratic coun­
tries to combat American imperialist ....
55
to liberlize all oppressed people
As previously mentioned the Communists see themselves 
as the agents of history and take the ultimate destruction 
of imperialist system for granted. They will use any 
means to promote this triumph, to realize world revolution
and the defeat of imperialism. Communist Chinese leaders
\i ' „ believe they should aid the poor, oppressed countries as
well as the liberation movements. This was expllctly
depicted by Mao Tse-tung in his address to the opening
session of the Eighth Congress of the Chinese Communist
Party:
"We must give active support to the national 
Independence and Liberation Movements in 
Asia, Africa and Latin America, as well 
as to the Peace Movement and righteous
m»f * <w * w
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struggle in all countries throughout the 
' 56 
world ".
Communist China’s aid to North Korea in 195G ,,n& its 
aid to revolutionary Vietnamese can be looked as a de­
fence against imperialist invaders and their attempts 
to end "democratic revolution" as defined in term of the 
Communist ideology. Aid to guerrilla forces in African 
states is justified as fulfilling the "anti-imperialist" 
and "world revolutionary" duties although they are not 
the sole motivating factors behind Chinese aid policy.
Prom April 1958 to the end of 1964, China had given the 
Indonesia government under Sukarno 17 6,2 million dollars 
of aid which included grants, loans, military and financial 
aid (see Table 2-2). One major reason for this aid was 
the anti-imperialist ideology espoused by both Mao Tse- 
tung and Sukarno. Against the background of a common 
ideology Communist China saw t o  need for unity among all 
potential revolutionary forces — - domestic as well as 
International. J .D . Armstrong argues that towards the 
end of 1964 Communist China encouraged revolutionary
tendencies within Indonesia through an alignment against
57 ' ’
external imperialism * Another argument advanced in
favour of Communist China's aid was to assist Sukarno
58
in suppressing internal anti-Communist activities .
Communist ideology is an important pillar of Communist
foreign aid policy in conformance with Marxist-Leninist
principles. To Chinese Communists their ideological
motivation is more than a mere rationalization. Peking's
leaders do, in fact, see international affairs in terms
of a world-wide revolutionary struggle. They feel a
strong sense of duty to spread Marxist-Leninist principles
and to speed up the "inevitable" course of world revolution,
and in doing so expand the area of Communist political
58 ‘
control . Aid therefore becomes one leverage in this 
struggle.
Table 2-2
Communist China's Aid to Indonesia Under Sukarno 
Unit: $ Mil I ion
AID DATE AMOUNT
Loan Nov. 1956 ' 15
Loan to oppress anti­
Communist activity April* 1958 1 1 ,2
Loan February, 1959 30
Loan April, 1961 20
Military and financial
grant December, 1964 100
SOURCE; H,K. Kao, The Development of Communist China's
Foreign Policy (Taipei: Cheng Chung Books, 1978) P. 148
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PART XXI
Communist China's Foreign Policy
As previously indicated aid is usually employed by 
countries as an instrument of foreign policy, and Communist 
China is inclined to use aid to realise the objectives 
of its foreign policy. Communist China's aid policy is 
an integral part of the overall global foreign policy 
of Peking.
There are many classifications of objectives of a country's
foreign policy. Robert E. Osgood has suggested a scheme
60
that app3 ies to the goals a country pursues . According 
to his scheme the goals of foreign policy fit roughly 
into two broad categories, depending on whether they re­
flect national self-interest or national idealism.
Goals of national self-interest relate to security or 
self-preservation, the protection and advancement of 
whatever matters are thought to be of "vital interest", 
the preservation or establishment of a position that per­
mits an Independent foreign policy, the preservation of 
national prestige and national honour, and finally 
national aggrandizement. Goals of national idealism, 
in contrast, emphasize the brotherhood of man, the 
importance of promoting human welfare, and the importance 
of resolving conflict through the application of reason,
63
morality, and law.
Arnold Wolfers suggests several other possible schemes
for classifacation. He distinguishes between "possession
61
goals" and "milieu goals Possession goals relate to
values that are particular to the state --- its rights,
its territory/ its prepogatlves, its power --- whereas
"milieu goals" relate to the environment in which the
nations operate and are not particular or exclusive f for
example, the preservation of world law and order or the
economic development of other states, Wolfers also
describes "direct national goals" and "indirect national
goals". According to his classification, national goals
are "direct" when the nation seeks direct benefit and
"indirect" when benefit to the nation is derived through
Individual benefit. He also suggests the possibility of
classifying goals into three categories:"goals of national
self-extentlon", "goals of national self-preservation",
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and "goald of self-abnegation" ,, Different categories 
of goals require different degrees of concern of power.
K.J.Holsti further proposes foreign policy objective 
categories that include three criteria: (1) the value 
placed on the objective, or the extent to which policy 
makers commit themselves and their countries' resources 
to achieving a particular objective; (2) the time element 
places on its achievement; and (3) the kinds of demands
■ %
%the objective imposes on other states in the international
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system , According to this scheme, there are three 
types of objectives; (1) core values and interests 
(short-term objectives); (2) middle-term goals; and (3) 
universal long-term objectives. Core values and 
interests are goals for which most people are willing to 
make the ultimate sacrifice. They are usually stated in 
the form of basic principles of foreign policy and become 
articles of faith. They are most frequently related to 
the self —pre servat ion of a po 1 i tic* a 1 uxil t . They ax e m o t  
vital and short-term objectives because other goals 
obviously cannot be achieved unless the political units 
maintain their own existence- Middle-term objectives 
normally impose demands on several other states. K.J.
Holati divides them into three types: the first type 
includes the attempts of governments to meet public and 
private demands and needs through international action; 
the second type is to increase a state’s standing in the 
international system; and the third type Includes the 
different instances of self-extension or imperialism. 
Long-term objectives are those plans,, dreams, and visions 
concerning the ultimate political or ideological organisation 
of the international system, rules governing relations in 
that system, and the role of specific nations within it.
If aid serves the objectives of foreign policy, and 
if the objectives of a state's policy are changing from time 
to time as Holsti states, it is a logical result that aid
64
will fluctuate in according with changes in a nation's 
goals. This sychronism is exemplified by Communist China’ 
aid and its foreign policy objectives.
Communist China’s foreign policy objectives can,
by adopting Holsti's scheme, be succinctly
6 4
divided into three groups : (1) short-term objectives.
It is apparent that fundamental aim of Peking's foreign 
policy is the maintenance of its territorial unification 
and national security , the promotion of its economic 
development, and the increase of national power, prestige 
and influence; {2} middle-term objectives; while some 
of the short-term and middle term objective overlap, 
Peking's desire to become the leading A s i m  power can be 
seen as a middle-term goal. Peking would like to esta­
blish Chinese-style Monroe Doctrine for Asia? (3) long­
term objectives: Communist China's ultimate goal aims 
at world revolution and world leadership. Although 
Communist China’s capability to achieve these ends may 
be questioned, Peking remains dedicated to these tenets 
despite internal difficulties and external obstacles.
This desire manifests itself in its nuclear-missile 
development programme, its diplomatic and revolutionary 
engagement in the Third World and the continuing challen­
ge it poses towards Soviet leadership of the world 
Communist movement.
The Chinese Communist Party seized power in 1949
and entered the Korean War in 1950, During this period; 
the Communist regime faced strong resistance from oppos­
ing forces on the mainland and the Nationalist military 
power of Taiwan. Internationally the problem of recog­
nition by the international community remained for many 
years unresolved. Its paramount goals were to consolidate 
the newly acquired power, to retain territorial integrity, 
and national security. In its effort to realize its 
territorial objectives, given the fact that Peking con­
tinued to regard Taiwan as an indisputable part of Chinese 
territory, any methond, peaceful or military, was likely 
to be resorted to this objective. With a view to esta­
blish national security, Communist China entered the 
Korean War and delivered aid to North Korea.
In terms of national security, China has an inner
65
and outer ring of defence . During 1950s the inner ring 
consisted of countries such as North Korea and North Viet­
nam which were ideologically, politically and almost 
militarily aligned to Communist China. They constituted 
the core of Peking's external security interests. These 
Communist regimes would be defended by Peking when they are 
threatened by other countries, even at the risk of war.
In order to strengthen its Northern-East Security ring, 
after the establishment of its regime Peking immediately 
conducted negotiations with the North Korean Government
on the joint construction of a dam project on the Yalu
66
Rivar, and agreed to finance the project . This may 
be described as aid rendered in support of national security.
When the Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950, the 
Chinese Communist regime was still weak and unstable, 
it confronted internal resistance and threats from Taiwan. 
Theoretically these problems were serious enough to ab­
sorb Chinese Communists attention and to leave no oppor­
tunities for the new regime's involvement in foreign 
disputes. However, as China believed its national securi­
ty to be threatened, it decided to intervene in the 
Korean War, although economically weak, poiical unstable 
and under military pressure from Taiwan.
It ha? been argued that the North Korean invasion of
South Korea was encouraged and supported by Communist
67
China . If it is true, the reasons for Peking's assis­
tance may well have been the expansion of Communist in­
fluence through the support of a "fraternal" communist 
regime and the strengthlng of the "inner-ring" of Chinese 
defence. It has also been said that Communist Chine
entry into the Korean War was prompted by a Soviet de-
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cision . Whatever the case security considerations 
were uppermost in the minds of Chinese Communist leaders 
when they decided to send their military forces into 
the Korean battlefield. This viewpoint is supported 
by a statement issued by the Communist Chinese regime.
The statement reveals as follows:
"It is known that although Korea is a small 
country, it possesses an important strategic
r <pr
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position. History tells us that the exis­
tence, of Korea is greatly related to Chinese 
safety .... the Chinese people support the 
Korean people against the United States 
not only for the reason of moral obligation 
but also for the fact that Korea's fate has 
a direct effect on our country? It is 
decided for the reason of Chinese self­
defence* therefore we must assist the
Korean people in order to defend our
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country ".
After the Korean War, Communist China’s objectives, 
have become enlarged extending from the issue of national
security to the achievement of regional ambitions ---
a middle-term goal. This new trend in Communist China's 
foreign policy resulted from changing internal and external 
factors. Internally the Chinese Communist Party had 
gained a certain solidarity as during the war tens of 
thousands of suspected Nationalist remainders were sent 
to fight in Ko-ea. Those not killed in action were re­
patriated to Taiwan by the United Nations at their re­
guest. This effectively undercut resistance. This 
allowed the Communist leaders to concentrate on the es­
tablishment of a central governing system. In January
195 3 it was announced that a People’s Congress would be 
convened at an early, but unspecified, date to approve
" * V' -•yvp/
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the first constitution of the Chinese Communist regime.
70
The Congress was eventually held one and half year later
The Chinese Communists had unified the country to an
71
amazing degree . The Communist Party wielded effective 
power over the whole country and faced little serious 
challenge from any quarter, Mao's writings were widely 
followed and were utilized by the Communist Party to in­
doctrinate the population. The first Five-Year Plan was
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initiated in 1953 with Soviet support .
Externally the Korean armistice relieved Communist
China of the heavy burden of war. Moreover, Peking's !!
intervention in Korea gained Soviet appreciation as it .
73 •
was interpreted as a "bona fide" proxy exercise . These ■
events, internally and externally, gave Communist China ,
;■ .' ■■ '•■ ; ■' • *the opportunity to pursue its regional objective. ;
To realize Asian dominance, Communist China has
attempted to expel both the American and Soviets, and
to reduce Japanese and Indian influence in this area to
74
the minimum .
The American image of Mao Tse-tung as an Asian
"Tito", was destroyed by Peking's role in the Korean War.
Earlier the United States considered to recognize the
. 75Communist regime as the legitimate government of China ,
but after the Communist Chinese intervention in the Korean
70
War, the American China policy changed dramatically.
Washington interpreted the Chinese Intervention in the
Korean War as final proof that Communist China was firmly
allied to Moscow furthering Soviet expansionism in Asia.
As a result, it discarded the belief of Mao Tse-tung as 
IS
an Asian Tito . Since then the United States began to
view Communist China as a contender in the Asian Cold War 
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theatre and extended its containment policy from Europe
78
to include the entire periphery of the Slno-Soviet bloc .
In fact, after the war, the United States regarded Communist
79
China as its most dangerous enemy in Asia and began to
support non-Communist regimes in Southeast Asia to check
80
Communist China's expanisionism .
From the Chinese viewpoint, the United States was 
perceived as distinct threat to China's security, inde­
pendence and power ambitions in Asia. Chinese Communist 
leaders regarded American bases in Asia as a direct 
threat to Communist China. The same was true of the U.S. 
military alliance system with Asian countries, and par­
ticularly the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) 
which was formed in 1954. In order to assure its regional 
power status, Communist China had to rollback U .S , in­
fluence from Asia. Thus during the 1950s Peking used 
economic aid to prevent the neutral countries of Asia 
from joining SEATO or any other alliance with the 
U ited States. In some cases, aid promises or deliveries
* suited in friendship pacts that stipulated
that neither side would join any alliance against the
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other . This explains why during the 1950s most re­
cipients of Communist China’s aid were Aslan countries, 
i.e. Cambodia, Burma, Nepal, Laos, Indonesia, Ceylon 
(present Sri Lanka) and Afghanistan received Chinese 
Communist aid in 1956, 1958, 1956, 1960, 1956, 1958 and 
1965, respectively. Hence Communist China's aid to 
Pakistan (1964), the third recipient of Chinese largesse, 
can be seen in the context of Peking’s efforts to pursue 
a balance of power policy on the Indian subcontinent
because India has been rega ded by Communist China as a
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major conipetor in Asia -
Ever since the 1960s, Communist China's ambitions have 
moved from the regional to the global level. Communist 
China clearly aspires to a leading role in the "socialist 
camp” and the international Communist movement. It as­
pires bo be a model for all underdeveloped countries.
This implies the ultimate exclusion of Soviet as well as 
American influence from the world’s regions. It also 
hopes to make Communist China a superpower comparable to
the United States and the Soviet Union by the end of the
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twentieth century . In pursuit of these objectives
Communist China has accused the superpowers, the United
States and the Soviet Union, as being intent on establi-
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shing world hegemony through mutual co-operation . 
Communist China also promulgate the theories of the ,
72
"Two intermediate zone" and the "Three Worlds". Accor­
ding to the first theory, Communist China has defined 
those countries independent, or striving for independence, 
in Asia, Africa and Latin America as the first inter­
mediate zone; while the whole of Western Europe, Oceania,
Canada, and other capitalist countries together form the
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second intermediate zone . By presenting the "Two in­
termediate zone" theory, Communist China poses as the 
leader of the first intermediate zone countri.es promising 
to help them to free themselves from U.S. Imperialist and 
Soviet oppression, and incites the second intermediate 
zone countries to do their utmost to free themselves from 
U.S, control.
According to the second theory, Communist China
contends that the world is divided into three spheres
that, while interconnected, are antagonistic. The
United States and the Soviet Union make up the First
World; the developing countries in Asia, Africa, Latin
America and other places constitute the Third World; the
developed countries, not: included in the First and Third
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Worlds belong to the Second World . Communist China
accuses the two superpowers (U.S. and U.S.S.R.) of the
extensive international exploitation and oppression which
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will result in a new world war . It not only tries to 
arouse the developing countries against the two super­
powers by arguing that "the numberous developing
’i r ?
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countries have long suffered from colonialist oppression and
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exploitation" but also encourages them to oppose imperia­
lism and Soviet socialism by insisting that "all of them 
still face the historic task of destroying the remnants
of colonialism, of developing their national economy and
89
consolidating their national independence" . At the
same time, Peking declares that "China is a socialist
country and a developing country as well, and therefore
belongs to the Third World", and publicly proclaims
that "the Chinese government and people firmly support
all oppressed peoples and oppressed nations in their
struggle to win, or to defend, their national independence,
develop their national economy and oppose colonialism,
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imperialism and hegemonism. This is our sacred duty V  
It is evident that Communist China regards itself as the 
leader of the Third World and is eager to achieve the 
position of a superpower.
In its pfforts to convince the Third World that 
Communist China is totally committed to their aspirations, 
Communist China's aid has flowed to the developing, or 
underdeveloped, countries, particularly to the African 
states since 1960. Table 2-3 indicates that the major 
recipients of Communist China's aid after 1960 have 
been African states.
Communist China's aid policy to Cambodia may serve us
W
an example to illustrate the employment of aid as a 
means to accomplish foreign policy objectives.
TABLE 2-3
Unit: $ Million
COMMUNIST CHINA'S ECONOMIC AID TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES BY AREA
1956
to
1971
1956
t:o
1960
1961 
to 
1964
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
TOTAL 2196 180 543 73 118 52 54 * 709 467
AFRICA 1112 26 247 27 41 22 454 295
EAST ASIA 281 76 87 18 43 57
SOUTH AMERICA 44 44
MIDDLE EAST 275 20 125 15 21 12 * 43 39
SOUTH ASIA 484 58 84 28 19 9 42 212 32
* Less than $ 500,000
Sourcei Leo Tanskyt Chinn's Foreign Aid: The Record in Current
Scene, vol. f(), no. 9 Sept, 1972, P. 2
Prior to 1950 Communist China's first concern was for 
its own security, and Cambodia posed little or no threat 
to Communist China; hence no aid was extended to this 
country, However, since the end of the Korean War, the 
overriding concern of Communist China was the preventation
of a U.S. dominated alliance in Indo-Chlna or the es­
tablishment of U.S. bases in the region. At that time, 
Cambodia faced a serious threat of being swallowed up 
by its traditional adversaries — —  Thailand and Vietnam. 
Cambodia also had to content with internal Communist 
guerrillas and the Vletmlnb who supported the Communist 
ideology. In an effort to prevent Cambodia from falling 
under American influence, Communist China jettisoned the 
ideological bond between itself and the Vietminh. Chou 
En-lai was prepared to exert pressure on the Vietminh 
and Peking's Cambodian allies to moderate their demands
for Communist control in Cambodia, on the assurance that
91
Cambodia would remain neutral and not join SEATO . In
June 1956, after prince Sihanouk visit to Peking, Chou
also promised to give Cambodia economic aid. Sihanouk
announced that Communist China had agreed to restrain
the Vietminh in Cambodia and he promised not to align
92
himself with th3 United States .
Communist China's relations with Cambodia were 
further strengthened after Sihanouk renounced all 
American economic and military aid on November 12, 1963. 
In response to Sihanouk's anti-American gesture Communist 
China Issued a statement on November 21 expressing its 
resolute support for Cambodia, "The Chinese government 
solemnly declares that if the Kingdom of Cambodia, which 
has persevered in its policy of peace and neutrality,
%of a U.S. dominated alliance in Indo-China or the es­
tablishment of U.S. bases in the region. At that time, 
Cambodi * faced a serious threat of being swallowed up
;:>y its traditional adversaries --- Thailand and Vietnam.
Cpmbodia also had to content with Internal Communist 
guerrillas and the Vietminh who supported the Communist 
ideology. In an effort to prevent Cambodia from falling 
under American influence, Communist China jettisoned the 
ideological bond between itself and the Vietminh. Chou 
En-lai was prepared to exert pressure on the Vietminh 
and Peking's Cambodian allies to moderate their demands
foi Communist control in Cambodia, on the assurance that
91
Cambodia would remain neutral end not join SEATO . In
June 1956, after prince Sihanouk visit to Peking, Chou
also promised to give Cambodia economic aid. Sihanouk
announced that Communist China had agreed to restrain
the Vietminh in Cambodia and he promised r- to align
92
himself with the United States .
Communist China's relations with Cambodia re 
further strengthened after Sihanouk renounced all 
American economic and military aid on November 12, 196 3. 
In response to Sihanouk's anti-American gesture Communist 
China issued a statement on November 21 expressing its 
resolute support for Cambodia, "The Chinese government 
solemnly declares that If the Kingdom of Cambodia, which 
has persevered in its policy of peace and neutrality,
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should encounter armed invasion instigated by the U.S.
and its vassals, the Chinese government and people will
firmly side with the Kingdom of Cambodia and give it
our all-out support, U.S. imperialism must bear all the
93
consequences arising there from" .
Communist Chine.’ s attitude towards the Sihanouk 
regime changed dramatically since 1967. At this juncture 
Communist China shifted its attention from regional power 
to international power, meanwhile, Cambodia began to 
court the United States and the Soviet Union. In June
196 9 the Cambodia government resumed relations with the 
United States, hence Peking refused to offer further 
aid and reactivated its support the Cambodian rebels.
This may be seen as a retaliation for Cambodian cooperation 
w' h the two superpowers. As Sihanouk pointed cut in 
1968
"The war has bean imposed on us because I
have not agreed to become the ally or
94
satellite of China" .
He specifically pointed out that Cambodia was pu­
nished by Communist China for receiving the U.S. mission 
headed by Chester Bowles, in January 1968, which dis­
cussed the issue of American "hot pursuit" of Vietnamese
95
Communist troops retreating into Cambodia .
When the Vietnam War was at its peak in 1970,
Communist China sided with the Vietnamese Communists to
combat the United States and South Vietnamese. When
Sihanouk was ousted in 1 970, to be succeeded by Lon Nol,
Communist China initially tried to cut its commitment
to the Cambodian rebels and to improve relations with
the new Cambodian government. When Peking later realised
that the new Cambodian government was not prepared to
give Vietnamese Communist sanctuaries to the extent
as had Sihanouk, Peking reverted to its previous stance
96
of supporting the "people's war" .
Communist China's aid relations with Cambodia graphi­
cally illustrate that Chinese Communist aid is extended 
to serve Peking's foreign policy objectives. When its 
foreign policy objectives contradict its ideological 
aspirations, the former always cornea prior to the latter.
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